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Gonzalez: Conflicts of Interest and Other Ethical Issues Facing Bankruptcy

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND OTHER ETHICAL
ISSUES FACING BANKRUPTCY LAWYERS: IS
DISINTERESTEDNESS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE

THE INTEGRITY OF THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM?
ArthurJ. Gonzalez*

I.

INTRODUCTION**

As the title of today's presentation indicates, the focus of my remarks will be on the ethical issues that face bankruptcy lawyers. I
thought it would be helpful to approach these issues by analyzing the
ethical considerations that would face an attorney regarding a nonbankruptcy retention under a particular set of facts, and then add to
those facts that the client files bankruptcy and seeks to retain the same
attorney. For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the attorney
is competent to represent a client in bankruptcy and therefore will not
address the ethical requirements regarding competency. However, this is
not intended to leave anyone with the impression that the competency
issue is any less of an ethical consideration in bankruptcy than in any
other area of the law. Following the discussion of the non-bankruptcy
retention and the bankruptcy retention, I will then present my own view
of what changes in the retention area of bankruptcy practice, if any,
should be considered.

* Arthur J. Gonzalez is a United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New
York. This is the text of the speech, which was modified slightly during oral presentation, Judge
Gonzalez gave at the Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Professorship Lecture. This text has been
supplemented by citations and footnotes. Judge Gonzalez would like to recognize the contribution
of Heike Vogel, a third year law student at Brooklyn Law School, in providing research and initial
drafting assistance.
** I would like to express my gratitude to the Hofstra University School of Law, especially
Professor Alan N. Resnick, for inviting me to present the Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Professorship Lecture. It is a great honor to have been selected to present this lecture at a program
named for Benjamin Weintraub. I never had the good fortune to have met Benjamin Weintraub but
he is someone whose legacy touches all those who are involved in the field of bankruptcy law.
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FACTS

Assume that Blue Company, a small manufacturing business,
asked its attorney from a small law firm to resolve a dispute with Green
Bank. Green Bank has been lending Blue Company operating capital for
a number of years and allegedly has a security interest in all of Blue
Company's receivables and inventory. The principal and majority
shareholder of the company has personally guaranteed the loan. Finally,
the attorney believes that the company is solvent.
As to the attorney's relationship with Blue Company, it owes her
$5,000 for prior work performed on other matters and the bill is a few
months overdue. In addition, the attorney formed the corporation a
number of years ago and as partial payment received a one percent interest in the company. She has acted as the corporate secretary for a
number of years with no compensation. The attorney also represents
Green Bank on an ongoing basis in real estate matters, however, she has
no intention of trying to represent Green Bank with respect to any of its
loans to Blue Company.
To recap, the relationships presented by this fact pattern are:
1) the attorney is a creditor of Blue Company;
2) she is a stockholder of Blue Company;
3) she is a corporate officer of Blue Company;
4) if she accepts this matter, she would be representing Blue Company against another one of her clients, Green Bank;
5) the principal of Blue Company has given Green Bank a personal
guarantee; and
6) Blue Company is solvent at the time of its bankruptcy filing.
A. Non-Bankruptcy Conflicts of InterestAnalysis
Although a majority of states have adopted the more recently developed Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), New
York State uses the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code") when determining the proper standard of attorney conduct.'
Since many amendments to the New York Code draw upon the Model

1. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 5
(5th ed. 1998); William . Kohn & Michael P. Shuster, DecipheringConflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy Representation, 98 COM. L.L 127, 127-28 (1993) (providing that by 1993 thirty-six states,
the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands had replaced the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility ("Code") with the Model Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility ("Model Rules")).
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Rules, pertinent provisions specifically addressing conflicts of interest

situations under both statutes will be examined in this Section.
For purposes of the present discussion, the relevant sections of the
New York Code are Disciplinary Rules 5-101(A), entitled "Refusing
Employment When the Interest of the Lawyer May Impair Independent
Professional Judgment;"3 DR 5-105, entitled "Refusing to Accept or
Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the
Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer;' DR 5-109, concerning conflicts between the organization as client and the organization's constituents; 5 and DR 9-101, concerning avoidance of the appearance of impropriety. These disciplinary rules of the New York Code are
in the Model Rules, which
almost identical to the provisions set forth
7
regulate concurrent conflicts of interest.
One concludes from the disciplinary rules that a client is entitled to
"undivided loyalty." In our adversary system, each side has the right to
have its position represented to the fullest extent whether in court, negotiating a contract, or any other facet of the law that the attorney's retention includes.' The role then of the advocate must be played out with

2. See STEPHEN GiLLERS & RoY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 769 (1998).
3. N.Y. JUD. LAW app. DR 5-101(A) (McKinney 1992).
4. Id. app. DR 5-105.
5. See id. app. DR 5-109.
6. Seeid. app. DR9-101.
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.7; Rule 1.1 1(a)-(c); Rule 1.12(a);
Rule 1.13(a), (d) (1999). The New York Code disciplinary rules relating to conflicts of interest and
their Model Rules counterparts are as follows: DR 5-101(A) corresponds to Model Rule 1.7(b);
DR 5-105 corresponds to Model Rule 1.7(a), (b); DR 5-109 corresponds to Model Rule 1.13(d);
DR 9-101(A) corresponds to Model Rule 1.12(a); and DR 9-101(B) corresponds to Model Rule
1.1 1(a)-(c).
8. See Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41
EMORY L.J. 467, 469 (1992). In his article, Professor Freedman states:
It is within this constitutionalized adversary system, in which individual rights are central, that American lawyers carry out their traditional and essential role. The right to
counsel has thus been called "the most pervasive" of rights, because it affects the ability of individuals in society to avail themselves of ali other rights.
This is equally true, moreover, in non-litigation settings. Any lawyer who counsels
a client, negotiates on a client's behalf, or drafts a legal document for a client must do
so with an actual or potential adversary in mind. When a contract is negotiated, there is
a party on the other side. A contract, a will, or a form submitted to a government
agency may well be read at some later date with an adversary's eye, and could become
the subject of challenge and litigation. The advice given to a client and acted upon today may strengthen or weaken the client's position in negotiations or litigation next
year. In short, all lawyers, and not just the advocate in the courtroom, necessarily function in the adversary system.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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only one goal-to present, within the parameters of the law and ethical
considerations, the interests of the client.9 If an attorney's loyalties are
divided the adversary system has been compromised and confidence in
the fairness of such system is diminished." However, it appears that,
pursuant to the disciplinary rules, when the "undivided loyalty" issue
arises, it can be resolved through disclosure and consent."
B. Analysis of Ethical Considerationsin
Non-Bankruptcy
The attorney's relationship to the client as a creditor, stockholder,
and corporate officer is addressed in DR5-101(A), which provides:
"Except with the consent of the client after full disclosure, a lawyer

shall not accept employment if the exercise of [the lawyer's] professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be affected by [the lawyer's] own financial, business, property, or personal
interests."' 2 Thus, it appears that after full disclosure and consent of the
client, the attorney can continue to represent the client.'3
As to the personal guaranty, that consideration is covered by DR 5109(A), which requires the attorney to explain the relationship and the
fact that the attorney's obligations are to the corporate client and not to
9. See MODEL CODE OFPROEsSIONALRESPONSBIurY EC 5-1 (1980). EC 5-1 provides:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the
law, solely for the benefit of [the] client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither [the lawyer's] personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the
desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute [the lawyer's] loyalty to [the] client.
Id.
10. See Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization
Cases, 48 S.C. L. REV. 793, 810-11 (1997). In his article, Smith states:
Conflict rules are essential for a variety of reasons, including the assurance of adequate
representation, preservation of confidences and maintaining the integrity of our adversary system. Conflict rules also preserve the intangible bond between client and lawyer.
Call it loyalty, call it what you will, we perhaps sense it better than we define it. Our
reaction to specific situations is the true litmus test. Perhaps it is our sense of injustice
that is involved.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
11. See N.Y. JUD. LAW app. DR 5-101(A); 5-105(C) (McKinney 1992).
12. Id. app. DR 5-101(A).
13. See id. In addition to DR 5-101(A), DR 5-105(C) provides:
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interest[s] of each and
if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of the lawyer's independent professional judgment on
behalf of each.
Id. app. DR 5-105(C).
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the individual interests of the client's principals. 4 However, from a
practical consideration, it could be very difficult for the client's principal to understand or accept this relationship, especially in a closely held
corporation. Regarding Green Bank also being the attorney's client, a
conflict of interest exists that must be addressed before she can accept
the engagement. 5
Assume that the attorney discloses all of these issues to her client
who is not troubled by them. Moreover, the attorney informs the bank of
the issue and awaits its response. When the bank responds, it does not
have an objection to the attorney representing the company against the
bank, and therefore it executes a waiver form. 16 With respect to all the
disciplinary rules mentioned and applied to a non-bankruptcy proceeding, the key is full disclosure and the consent from all parties involved.
C. What has Happened by the Above?
Returning to our fact pattern, Blue Company has been advised of
the connections the attorney has-the disclosure requirement. The attorney has also advised Green Bank of any possible conflict. The attorney received consent from both clients. With the disclosure and consent
requirements satisfied, the issue is now resolved from a conflicts of interests standpoint. It seems that the attorney has complied with her ethical obligations and all is well. However: Does not the conflict between
the interests of each of her clients still exist? Is it still not possible that
her loyalty to the company in this action may be compromised or at
least appear that it may be compromised?
What has happened by receiving the consent of both, the bank as
well as the company, is that their rights with respect to the conflict have
been waived and each has accepted that the attorney will act with undivided loyalty to Blue Company. The system has afforded each client the
opportunity to exercise its rights.

14. See id. app. DR 5-109(A). DR 5-109(A) provides:
When a lawyer employed or retained by an organization is dealing with the organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, and it
appears that the organization's interests may differ from those of the constituents with
whom the lawyer is dealing, the lawyer shall explain that the lawyer is the lawyer for
the organization and not for any of the constituents.
Id.
15. See id. app. DR 5-101(A).
16. See id. app. DR 5-105(C). It is important to note that an attorney has to consider all of
the aforementioned as to each attorney in her law firm. See id. app. DR 5-105(D).
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What about the issue of an appearance of impropriety? Should the
company not be required to find an attorney that has no relationship
with the bank so that the system would not only be fair, but also appear
fair?
In spite of the above, it seems that the ethical considerations have
been satisfied and the system is protected because each client has been
made aware of the connections and has freely chosen to consent to the
attorney's representation of Blue Company. As far as the appearance to
the outside, there are only two parties involved, Blue Company and
Green Bank; each party has had the opportunity to exercise its rights,
and they have chosen to waive them.
If the company were to file bankruptcy and seek to retain the same
attorney, is there any difference in the analysis? Should there be any difference?

I.

BANKRUPTCY

Bankruptcy is a body of law that, among other things, enables
people and companies to be relieved of obligations to pay debts, in part
or in full. 17 Also, it may provide for the continued existence of an entity
even though it has not fully complied with its economic obligations.' 8
From a creditor's vantage point, bankruptcy provides an orderly system
to divide a limited fund in an equitable manner.' 9 Whether the debtor is
liquidating or reorganizing, the debtor must proceed in a manner which
considers the interests of the "estate" that are created at the filing and
any class of creditors or equity security holders."
Both the New York State ethical requirements (or the applicable
ethical requirements in the state in which the court is sitting) and § 327
of the Bankruptcy Code apply in each bankruptcy case?' It seems that
17. See, e.g., In re Jonson, 17 B.R. 78, 79 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1981) ("Mhe purpose of a
Chapter 13 plan is to enable a debtor to pay either in full or in part, 'debts which have become too
burdensome to meet without the help of the bankruptcy laws."' (quoting In re Yee, 7 B.R. 747,
758 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980))).
18. See In re Russell, 60 B.R. 42,44 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985).
19. See Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Hollytex
Carpet Mills, Inc.), 73 F.3d 1516, app. at 1524 (10th Cir. 1996).
20. See In re Fremont Battery Co., 73 B.R. 277,278-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
21. See, e.g., In re Allboro Waterproofing Corp., 224 B.R. 286, 291 n.3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1998).
Federal bankruptcy courts sitting in New York generally apply the Code of Professional
Responsibility to ethical disputes, including disqualification motions. Indeed, pursuant
to local rules, attorneys must read and become familiar with the Code of Professional
Responsibility before they may be admitted to practice in local New York federal
courts.
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when you examine the concerns of the New York Code and § 327 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the ethical issues are the same. However, bankruptcy
differs in that the ethical issues must be viewed in a much broader con-

text;22 the attorney must consider the interests of the estate as well as
each class of creditors and equity holdersY Further, in bankruptcy the
issue of waiver and consent is far more difficult to address and, in fact,

may not even apply in certain circumstances.24

Section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code controls the retention of professionals in a bankruptcy case,s and refers to the retention of professionals by a trustee.26 However, § 1107(a) provides that a debtor-inId. (citation omitted); see In re Caldor, Inc., 193 B.R. 165, 178 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1996) (looking to
the Code of Professional Responsibility to analyze a conflict of interest under the Bankruptcy
Code); In re City Mattress, Inc., 163 B.R. 687, 687-88 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying 11
U.S.C. § 327 (1994) to a conflict of interest dispute involving a retainer arrangement including a
mortgage on property that the debtor-in-possession used, but did not own).
22. In the interest of time limitations and due to the complexity of the issues surrounding
insolvent corporations outside of bankruptcy, this presentation did not address the issue of the
ethical obligations counsel to a corporation must consider when representing an insolvent corporation outside of bankruptcy. For example, the fiduciary duty of directors of a corporation extends to
creditors once a corporation is insolvent outside of bankruptcy. See In re Kingston Square Assoc.,
214 B.R. 713, 720, 735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). A complete analysis of all ethical issues facing
bankruptcy lawyers should include a comparison of a lawyer's ethical obligations concerning an
insolvent entity prior to and after filing bankruptcy.
23. See Smith, supra note 10, at 824 n.120 (noting the precarious situation that arises for a
bankruptcy attorney because the attorney must represent the interests of the estate, each class of
creditors, and the equity holders).
24. See In re Sauer, 191 B.R. 402, 408 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); In re B.E.S. Concrete Prods.,
Inc., 93 B.R. 228, 235 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988) ("[W]alver is more difficult to obtain in a chapter
11 case because the debtor in possession stands in a fiduciary capacity that constrains its ability to
make such a waiver.").
25. See I1 U.S.C. § 327 (1994).
26. See id. Section 327 states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the court's approval,
may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that
are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's
duties under this title.
(b) If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of the debtor under section 721,
1202, or 1108 of this title, and if the debtor has regularly employed attorneys, accountants, or other professional persons on salary, the trustee may retain or replace such professional persons if necessary in the operation of such business.
(c) In a case under chapter 7, 12, or I I of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such person's employment by or representation of a creditor, unless there is objection by another creditor or the United States
trustee, in which case the court shall disapprove such employment if there is an actual
conflict of interest.
(d) The court may authorize the trustee to act as attorney or accountant for the estate if
such authorization is in the best interest of the estate.
(e) The trustee, with the court's approval, may employ, for a specified special purpose,
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possession shall have the fights and duties of a trustee.27 Therefore, the

debtor, as debtor-in-possession, may retain professionals and that retention must comply with §327. Under § 327(a), "the trustee ... may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or

other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons ....
" Although
the Code "does not define 'adverse interest' in any of its provisions,"29 it

provides an extensive definition of "disinterested person" in § 101(14).?'
Subsections (A) through (D) of § 101(14) list specific types of relationships that prevent professionals from being disinterested and thus dis-

qualify the professional for employment under § 327(a)? "[S]ubsection
(E), which is a 'catchall' provision, 32 generally disqualifies anyone
with "an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any

class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or

other than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor, if in the best interest of the estate, and if such attorney does not represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed.
(f) The trustee may not employ a person that has served as an examiner in the case.
Id.
27. See id. § 1107(a). Section 1107(a) provides:
Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter, and to such
limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all
the rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this title, of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
Id.
28. Id. § 327(a).
29. R. Craig Smith, Note, Conflicts of Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to
Increase Public Confidence in the Banknptcy System, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1045, 1050
(1995).
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (1994).
31. See id. Section 101(14)(A)-(D) provides:
"disinterested person" means person that(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(B) is not and was not an investment banker for any outstanding security of the debtor;
(C) has not been, within three years before the date of the filing of the petition, an investment banker for a security of the debtor, or an attorney for such an investment
banker in connection with the offer, sale, or issuance of a security of the debtor;
(D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a
director, officer, or employee of the debtor or of an investment banker specified in subparagraph 03) or (C) of this paragraph[.]
Id.
32. G. Ray Warner, Of Grinches,Alchemy and Disinterestedness:The Commission'sMagically DisappearingConflicts of Interest, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. Rnv. 423, 428 (1997).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol28/iss1/2

8

Gonzalez: Conflicts of Interest and Other Ethical Issues Facing Bankruptcy
1999]

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an
investment banker... or for any other reason."33
The dual requirements of being disinterested and of not holding or
representing an interest adverse to the estate appears to be a unique
feature of bankruptcy proceedings which has divided experts in the
field.' Opponents of the employment standards have suggested that the
per se disqualification provisions of the disinterestedness standard for
professionals employed by the debtor-in-possession should be abandoned and that the Code should define adverse interest similarly to the
definition of conflict of interest contained in the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers." On the other hand, supporters of the strict
anti-conflict rule in bankruptcy cases argue that the unique nature of the
bankruptcy process requires an additional standard which ensures that
the interests of all parties involved are protected. 6 Moreover, propo-

nents reason that given the complex relationships that exist only in
bankruptcy proceedings, it is necessary to avoid any appearance of im-

propriety in order to preserve public confidence in the bankruptcy system."
Bankruptcy courts are also divided as to the proper application of
the employment standards. Some courts strictly follow the per se dis-

33. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(E).
34. See Gerald KCSmith, Standardsfor the Employment of Professionals in Bankruptcy
Cases: A Response to ProfessorZywicki's "Casefor Retaining the DisinterestednessRequirement
for Debtorin Possession'sProfessionals," 18 MIss. C. L. REv. 327, 327 (1998); see also Ethics:
Is Disinterestedness Still a Viable Concept? A Discussion, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 201
(1997) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (providing a general discussion attempting to clarify the
disinterestedness requirement).
35. See Smith, supranote 10, at 898-99. The Restatement Third provides that: "A conflict of
interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would
be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person." RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
36. See Warner, supra note 32, at 429.
37. See id. at 429-30.
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qualification requirement," and others have adopted a more flexible interpretation of the disinterestedness standard."
Before I continue with the discussion of § 327, I would like to

briefly discuss Bankruptcy Rule 2014,40 the disclosure rule without
which the purpose of § 327 would be undermined.
A.

DisclosureRequirement in Bankruptcy
Proceedings

Rule 2014 of the FederalRules of Bankruptcy Proceduremandates
disclosure of actual and potential conflicts of interest. 41 In In re Granite
38. See Childress v. Middleton Arms, L.P. (In re Middleton Arms, Ltd. Partnership), 934
F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[A] court cannot approve the employment of a person who is not
disinterested, even if the person does not have an adverse interest."); Pierce v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(In re Pierce), 809 F.2d 1356, 1362-63 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming bankruptcy court's finding that
attorney who is a pre-petition creditor is not "disinterested"); Merrimac Assocs. v. Daig Corp. (In
re Daig Corp.), 799 F.2d 1251, 1253 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding a management consulting firm that
received a stock purchase warrant from the debtor to not be "disinterested"); In re Siliconix, Inc.,
135 B.R. 378, 380 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("[W]e rule that creditors are per se interested and thus barred
from employment by § 327(a) ....
").
39. See In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[Section] 327(a) will not support,
either by its terms or by its objectives, a bright-line rule precluding an attorney at all times and
under all circumstances from taking a security interest to safeguard the payment of his fees."); In
re Palumbo Family Ltd. Partnership, 182 B.R. 447, 466 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (declining to follow decisions upholding a per se rule for disqualification and instead applying a "fact-intensive
inquiry into the situation presented"); In re Gilmore, 127 B.R. 406, 409 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1991)
(rejecting the per se rule and declaring that a "[c]ourt should examine the circumstances of each
case to determine if the security interest in favor of the attorney is necessary or is overreaching by
the attorney"); In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 114 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
(rejecting a literal interpretation of § 327(a) and applying a balancing test weighing "the risk and
gravity of the potential conflict of interest with the costs that the estate and perhaps the public
would incur in the event of disqualification of the professional"); see also Lillian E. Kraemer,
Ethical Issues Involving Case Professionalsand Other Court-Appointed Parties in Chapter 11
Proceedings,C946 ALI-ABA 1, 17-18 (Sept. 29, 1994) (providing a discussion of In re Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 114 B.R. 501).
40. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014.
41. See id. Rule 2014, entitled: 'Employment of Professional Persons" provides:
(a) APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER OF EMPLOYMENT. An order approving the
employment of attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, agents, or other professionals pursuant to § 327, § 1103, or § 1114 of the Code shall be made only on application of the trustee or committee. The application shall be filed and, unless the case is
a chapter 9 municipality case, a copy of the application shall be transmitted by the applicant to the United States trustee. The application shall state the specific facts showing the necessity for the employment, the name of the person to be employed, the reasons for the selection, the professional services to be rendered, any proposed
arrangement for compensation, and, to the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the
person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the
office of the United States trustee. The application shall be accompanied by a verified
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PartnersLtd. Partnership,42 a law firm did not disclose its increasing
representation of a client to the court.43 The Granite court noted that in
bankruptcy cases:
The scope of disclosure is much broader than the question of disqualification. ([A] court may find a disclosure violation even if the undisclosed connection does not amount to a conflict)....

Rule 2014(a) does not expressly require supplemental or continuing
disclosure. Nevertheless, section 327(a) implies a duty of continuing
disclosure, and requires professionals to reveal connections that arise
after their retention.... [This] [c]ontinuing disclosure [requirement] is
necessary to preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy system by ensuring that the trustee's professionals remain conflict free. 4
Moreover, in In re Leslie Fay Cos.,45 the court noted that proper disclosure allows the court to decide, in an informed manner, whether the retention should be approved.' The professional must disclose all facts
that bear on its disinterestedness.47 A failure to disclose undermines
§ 327 and the ability of the parties and the court to adequately review
the retention of a professional.

statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person's connections with the
debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants,
the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States
trustee.
(b) SERVICES RENDERED BY MEMBER OR ASSOCIATE OF FIRM OF
ATTORNEYS OR ACCOUNTANTS. If, under the Code and this rule, a law partnership or corporation is employed as an attorney, or an accounting partnership or corporation is employed as an accountant, or if a named attorney or accountant is employed,
any partner, member, or regular associate of the partnership, corporation or individual
may act as attorney or accountant so employed, without further order of the court.

Id.
42. 219 B.R. 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
43. See id. at 28-29.
44. Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
45. 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
46. See id. at 533 ("The purpose of Rule 2014 ... 'is to provide the court (and the United
States Trustee) with information necessary to determine whether the professional's employment
meets the broad test of being in the best interest of the estate." (quoting 8 L. KING, COLLIER ON
BANKRuPTCY, 2014.03 (15th ed.))). "Because the court was not armed with the facts, there was no
meaningful opportunity provided for the court to determine whether to approve or disapprove [the
law firm's] retention." Id. at 538.
47. See id. at 533.
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B. HistoricalBackground-Purposeof
DisinterestednessStandard
Although a disinterestedness standard already existed in the original Bankruptcy Act of 1898,48 its application to the debtor-in-possession
in the current Act of 1978 4 has been drawn into question." Chapter X,

entitled "Corporate Reorganizations," of the 1898 Act provided in § 156
that "[a]ny trustee appointed under this chapter shall be disinterested
....,,51
Section 157 further stated that "[a]n attorney appointed to represent a trustee under this chapter shall also be a disinterested person
....,52

It has been pointed out that the managers of the estate under the

1898 Act had to be disinterested because Chapter X required the removal of the old debtor management. 3 It therefore seemed only logical
that the counsel of the disinterested manager should also be disinterested- 4 Since § 1107(b) of the current 1978 Act provides that the manager of the estate does not always have to be disinterested,55 the application of the disinterestedness standard in the old Chapter X to the

retention of professionals by the debtor-in-possession has been questioned. 6 Critics of the disinterestedness standard point out that its application to debtors-in-possession was an unintended result, which may be
traced back to drafting errors in § 1107(b).57 In order to further support
this argument, one critic has pointed out that "significant change in re-

organization practice was neither contemplated by the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States nor discussed in the five years
of Congressional hearings leading to the 1978 enactment of the Bank48. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 158, ch. X, 11 U.S.C. § 558 (repealed 1978), reprinted in
THE BANKRUPrCY ACr OF 1898 AS AMENDED INCLUDING THE CHANDLER Acr OF 1938, at 133
(annotated by John Hanna & James Angell McLaughlin 1939) [hereinafter Hanna & McLaughlin].
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994).
50. See, e.g., In re Covey, 57 B.R. 665, 666 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986) ("An overly rigid, mechanical application of the standards to the debtor-in-possession would serve no one's best interests."); Smith, supra note 10, at 812-15 (discussing the controversy surrounding the frequent disqualification of debtor's counsel in Chapter 11 cases due to the "disinterestedness test").
51. Hanna & McLaughlin, supra note 48, at 132.
52. Id. at 133.
53. See Panel Discussion, supra note 34, at 207.
54. See id.
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) (1994). Section 1107(b) states, in relevant part that "a person is
not disqualified for employment under section 327 of this title by a debtor in possession solely
because of such person's employment by or representation of the debtor before the commencement
of the case." Id.
56. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57. See Richard Lieb, The Section 327(a) "Disinterestedness" Requirement: Does a Prepetition Claim Disqualify an Attorney for Employment by a Debtor in Possession?, 5 AM. BANKR.
INsT.L. REv. 101, 128 (1997).
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ruptcy Code."58 This assertion appears to be supported by the Congressional debates.59 During the debates regarding Bankruptcy Law Revisions, a question was raised concerning the capacity of a debtor-inpossession in a case under Chapter 11 to retain an attorney who worked
for the debtor before the case was filed.' This question was answered by
Congressman Butler with the following response:
On its face, section 1107 appears to subject a debtor-in-possession to
the provisions of section 327(a) which require an attorney to be a
"disinterested person" as defined in section 101(13). This would appear to preclude an attorney for the debtor from serving as an attorney
for the debtor-in-possession. This is not the intent.
Section 330, [dealing] with compensation of officers, clearly distinguishes the debtor's attorney from other professional persons employed under section 327. The disqualifying language of section
328(c) should not apply to deny compensation to an attorney for the
debtor-in-possession solely because of his prior service as attorney for
the debtor. That is simply not the kind of direct or indirect relationship
intended to 6abrogate the standard of disinterestedness under section
101(13)(E). 1
Thus, the Congressional Record seems to support the position that the
disinterestedness standard, as formulated under the original Bankruptcy
Code of 1898 and applied to professionals employed by the trustee, was
not intended to be extended to the counsel for the debtor-in-possession.
Nevertheless, supporters of the rigid anti-conflict rule, as applied to
the trustee and the debtor-in-possession, point out that both owe fiduciary obligations to the estate and to the creditors. 62 Moreover, since many
parties in a bankruptcy proceeding are not represented, they are dependent upon the integrity of the process which is to protect their interests. 63
Congressional Records indicate that major revisions of the 1898 Act
were necessary, because the public had lost confidence in the integrity
and fairness of the bankruptcy system due to widespread misconduct
among the ranks of bankruptcy professionals. 64 The Commission on the
Smith, supra note 34, at 331.
See 124 CONG. REC. H457, H472 (1978).
See id.
Id.
See Warner, supra note 32,at 429.
See id.
64. See H.R. REP.No. 95-595, at 96 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6057-58;
see also PanelDiscussion, supra note 34, at 206 ("One of the motivations for adopting the Bank58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

ruptcy Code was this public perception that there was misconduct in the professional ranks of the
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Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which was established by Congress in 1970 to analyze and evaluate changes in the original Bankruptcy Act, commented on the referee's dual role as follows:
[M]aking an individual[, the bankruptcy judge,] responsible for conduct of both administrative and judicial aspects of a bankruptcy case is
incompatible with the proper performance of the judicial function.
Even if a paragon of integrity were sitting on the bench and could keep
his mind and feelings insulated from influences which arise from his
previous official connections with the case before him and with one of
the parties to it, he probably could not dispel the appearance of a relationship which might compromise his judicial objectivity. 5
As a result of the referee's multiple and conflicting duties, the early
bankruptcy system was viewed by many as an unfair forum. 66 This sentiment of public mistrust was further warranted by an investigation in
1929 of the Southern District of New York, which revealed "serious
abuses and malpractices on the part of attorneys, receivers, trustees, appraisers, custodians, auctioneers, and other persons and associations.""
Although the investigation was launched in New York City, the Report
found that "fundamental defects in administration are' not restricted to
New York, but exist generally throughout the country."
With this historical background in mind, it is not surprising that the
drafters of the 1978 Act emphasized that reforms were aimed at establishing a bankruptcy forum that was fair not only in fact but in appearance as well." "As the Commission Report states, '[t]here must always
be vigilance to ensure that the public has confidence in the bankruptcy
system's fairness and that it is operating to the public benefit, not just to

bankruptcy practice.").
65. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
137, pt. 1, at 93-94 (1973).

66. See Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer,Director,and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization PassionPlay, 69
AM. BANKR. L.. 431, 433 (1995) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5965-66); Marcia Ann Miller, Bankruptcy Law-Excluded Property-A Debtor's
Pension Plan is Excluded from the Bankruptcy Estate Because Anti-Alienation Clauses in Qualified ERISA PensionPlans Establish a Transfer Restriction Recognizable Under Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law in Section 541(c)(2)----Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992), 23 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1763, 1764 n.1 (1993) (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-764, at 17-18 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5230).
67. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 96, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6058.
68. Id. at 97, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6058 (quoting Counsel to the Petitioners in
the Matter of Inquiry into the Administration of Bankrupt Estates, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., Administrationof Bankrupt Estates 3-4 (Comm. Print for Comm. on the Judiciary 1931)).
69. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5966.
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enrich debtors and their professionals."' 7" More specifically, with respect to the disinterestedness standard, the Commission Report explains
that "'[s]trict disinterestedness standards are necessary because of the
unique pressures inherent in the bankruptcy process.' 71 Thus, supporters of the disinterestedness standard maintain that the additional requirement is necessary to remind professionals employed by the trustee,
as well as for the debtor-in-possession, that a fiduciary obligation is imposed upon them and that interests other than their own must be protected.72 As Judge Clevert, formerly a Bankruptcy Judge in the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, and now a district court judge there, noted during
a panel discussion:
We don't want something to come out of the woodwork that might
color the way in which that professional provides advice. Furthermore,
we don't want the product of any reorganization to be one that the
public, which does have an impact on the judicial process, will frown
upon out of a sense that everyone was a bit too cozy."
IV.

APPLICATION TO THE HYPOTHETICAL

With § 327's historical background in mind, let us return to our
hypothetical. As to the retention of the attorney's law firm by Blue
Company under § 327:
1) Does the attorney or her firm hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate?
2) Are she and her firm disinterested?
Hold an interest adverse to-it seems that this is just another way
of saying conflict of interest. And if it were, should not the result of the
conflict of interest analysis be the same as it was when the attorney's
retention was considered in the non-bankruptcy context?
In the non-bankruptcy analysis, there were two parties involved;
full disclosure and consent resolved any conflict. Does that work here?
Probably not. Remember, in pre-bankruptcy no one questioned the in-

70. Warner, supra note 32, at 429 (quoting NAT'L BANKR. REv. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY:
THE NEXT TWENTY YEARs, FINAL REPORT 875 (1997)) (alteration in original) [hereinafter
COMV'N REPORT].
71. Id. (quoting CONZIl'N REPORT, supranote 70, at 874) (alteration in original).
72. See id. at n.31 (citing COMM'N REPORT, supra note 70, at 874-75).
73. PanelDiscussion,supra note 34, at 204.
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terests of the estate.74 Our focus was on Blue Bank and Green Company.
In bankruptcy, however, the estate's interests need to be considered.75
When considering the estate's interests, does the fact that the attorney is a creditor mean that she holds an interest adverse to the estate? It
depends on the size of the creditor body and the outstanding liabilities.
It also depends on how this amount compares with the other outstanding
receivables she may have as an attorney. In all, she must consider factors that were not considered previously. As to her stock interest, here
too creditors may be concerned that she may jeopardize their interests to
protect her equity. Furthermore, as far as being an officer, this raises issues as to the attorney's possible involvement in decision-making, and
the fact that her advice may be influenced by her desire to protect herself from blame for the financial condition of the debtor. As to the guaranty, the issue of divided loyalty is raised, but again it is not just between Green Company and its principal-this time it involves all
creditors. In the end, the issue of disinterestedness will be raised and a
balancing will take place. Included in this test will be the appearance of
impropriety. Now we are in the bankruptcy fish bowl. The system is not
only considering the interests of the parties but how does the bankruptcy
system appear-will it appear fair? Does consent resolve these issues?
Assume there is a retention hearing and no one objects. Is that consent by all the parties?
What would happen if the attorney were to obtain a written waiver
from all the parties? A waiver may be sufficient. However, assume for
the moment that after review of all the facts, all the attorney's connections are so de minimus that she could be found not to have had an adverse interest to the estate.
At this point, the court must consider whether the attorney meets
the disinterestedness prong of § 327(a). 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) states that a
disinterested person:
(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider; (B) is not
and was not an investment banker for any outstanding security of the
debtor; (C) has not been, within three years before the date of the filing
of the petition, an investment banker for a security of the debtor, or an
attorney for such an investment banker in connection with the offer,
sale, or issuance of a security of the debtor; (D) is not and was not,
within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a director,

74. See supra note 22.
75. See Warer, supranote 32, at 429.
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officer, or employee of the debtor or of an investment banker specified
in subparagraph (B) or (C)[.] 76
"[S]ubsection (E), which is a 'catch-all' provision,"7 7 generally disqualifies anyone with "an interest materially adverse to the interest of
the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest
in, the debtor or an investment banker... or for any other reason."78
As to subsection (A) it is clear that she does not qualify. She is a
creditor, equity holder, and insider. Can it be cured?
She could waive her claim as a creditor. She could divest herself as
an equity holder. As to her insider status as an officer, she could resign.
Subsections (B) and (C) do not apply. However, as to subsection
(D), she has been an officer within the last two years, and it would seem
that this cannot be cured. Although the attorney can resign to solve the
problem under (A), it does not resolve the problem under (D).
As to subsection (E), to the extent the adverse interest prong of
§ 327 was met, this subsection really considers the same factors. Although its wording is broader, in that it addresses a materially adverse
interest not only to the estate, but to creditors and equity security holders, from a practical standpoint, it is virtually the same analysis.
Now where does the attorney stand in her retention? It would seem
that the disinterested requirement of § 327 is not met, and she cannot be
retained to handle the bankruptcy proceeding of Blue Company.
Does this make sense? Why not use a balancing test, considering
the interests of all the parties and if there are no objections, allow the
retention?
Certainly this would be the response of many practitioners and
some judges. However, in light of the history of bankruptcy law and its
concern for the appearance of fairness in the process, 71 it seems to me
that the rigid requirements of disinterestedness are necessary even
though one could strongly argue that there should be a de minimus exception. To an extent, I could accept that premise, but I believe that such
an exception would have to be carefully worded to prevent any abuse.

76. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A)-(D) (1994).
77. Warner, supra note 32, at 428.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(E).
79. See Warner,supra note 32, at 429-30.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

V.

[Vol. 28:67

CONCLUSION

Both a state's ethical requirements and § 327 apply in each bankruptcy case. 80 It seems to me that when you examine the concerns of the
New York Code and § 327 of the Bankruptcy Code the ethical issues are
the same. What differs in bankruptcy though, is that these issues must
be viewed in a much broader context; that being the interests of the estate and each class of creditors and equity holders. The issues of waiver
and consent are far more difficult to address and in fact may not even
apply in certain circumstances.

80. See id. at 430.
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